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If past meanings are potentially part of our own future, we must prepare ourselves to receive them 
when they arrive again. Such preparation includes learning to recognize what is past about 
them. Only then will we know how to accommodate them properly when they meet us upon their 
return.1
Abstract
It is the task of this paper to argue that the development of a new Qurʾān-sunna hermeneu-
tic (and therefore Islamic legal theory) which hermeneutically privileges an ethico-religious 
and purposive approach to a Qurʾānic interpretation (based on ethically objectivist nature 
of ethical value) has the potential to engender a gender symmetrical Islamic law. In order 
for this to be achieved, it is argued further, that the hermeneutical importance of the mir-
roring of the various socio-cultural and ethico-moral assumptions prevalent in the Qurʾān’s 
revelatory milieu in the actual Qurʾānic text itself must be taken into account as evident in 
those passages pertaining to the patriarchal nature of socio-legal aspects of gender dynamics 
and existence of slavery, especially female concubinage. Additionally, in the first part of the 
paper, I briefly discuss one reason why I consider the classical Islamic scholarship failed to 
explore the hermeneutical significance of these assumptions and therefore did not engender 
a Qurʾānic hermeneutic and Islamic legal theory that hermeneutically privileges an ethico-
religious and purposive based approach to interpretation of Qurʾān and sunna. I refer to 
this process as a hermeneutical shift from a Qurʾān-sunna interpretive dialogical approach 
to that of a sunna-ḥadith episteme. 
1 Peter, M. Wright, “Modern Qurʾānic Hermeneutics”, Ph.D. Thesis, Chapell Hill, 
2008, p. 197.
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Introduction
When engaging in the process of developing Qurʾānic hermeneutic2 and 
Islamic legal theory (usūl ul-fiqh) and, generations upon generations of 
Islamic legal theorists (usuliyyūn), jurists (  fuqahāʾ) and exegetes (mufassirūn) 
have primarily concerned themselves with the questions of what the Qurʾān 
has to say on a particular issue or theme but not what the Qurʾān tacitly 
assumes to be normative as understood by its direct audience and as 
evident in the Qurʾān’s content. They did not fully recognize the interpre-
tational implications of the Qurʾānic pre-suppositions present in its dis-
course, especially in relation to developing a Qurʾānic hermeneutic 
and Islamic legal theory whose most powerful hermeneutical tool would 
entail an ethico-religious values and purposive (qasḍ )3 based-approach to 
2 According to the leading Western theoretician of hermeneutics of the 20th century 
Hans-Georg Gadamer hermeneutics is “the classical discipline concerned with the art of 
understanding texts.” Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. Ed., trans. rev. 
Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London: Continuum, 2004,) 164. As such 
hermeneutical theories deal with “1.) nature of a text; 2.) what it means to understand a 
text; and 3.) how understanding and interpretation are determined by the presuppositions 
and beliefs (the horizon) of the audience to which the text is being interpreted.” Van A. 
Harvey, “Hermeneutics”, “Encyclopedia of Religion”, Ed. Lindsay Jones. Vol. 6. 2nd ed. 
(Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005) 3930–3936, 3930. In the context of religion, 
hermeneutics refers to the study of the interpretation of sacred texts, especially texts in the 
areas of theology and law. H. A. Virkler: Hermeneutics: Principles and Processes of Biblical 
Interpretation, (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1981). Hermeneutics is therefore a pro-
cess comprising of “both the understanding of the rules of exegesis and the epistemology of 
understanding—the study of the construction of meaning in the past and their relationship 
to the construction of meanings in the present.” D. S. Ferguson, Biblical Hermeneutics: 
An Introduction, Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1986.
3 In other words I subscribe to the view that the Author of the Qurʾān structured revela-
tory texts in such a way that its texts have intended meanings which in principle are discov-
erable rationally. In context of the Islamic tradition on this see Hashim Kamali, Mohammad 
Hashim Kamali, Maqasid Al Shariʾah and ijtihad as Instruments of Civilisational Renewal: 
A Methodological Perspective, Islam and Civilisational Renewal, 2,2, (2010): 245–271. 
Kamali on p. 250, gives following examples from the Qurʾān which support this view: the 
purpose of law of retaliation is preservation of life (2:179); the underlying objective of jihad 
is to fight injustice (22:39); the aims of performing prayers ( salat) are to repel evil and 
immorality (29:45); the payment of the compulsory alms tax is to prevent circulation of 
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 interpretation of the Qurʾān and sunna and the purposive nature of Islamic 
law and its philosophy.4 By ethico-religious values-based approach, I mean 
a broader hermeneutical method, which stipulates that the actual nature 
and character of the Qurʾān-sunna discourse is hermeneutically best served 
and privileges its own interpretation on the basis of certain ethico-religious 
principles such as justice, righteousness, equality etc., as based on the ethi-
cally objective nature of these values.5 By purposive nature of Islamic law 
and its philosophy I mean that the primary function of Islamic law and the 
most fundamental element in its methodology is based upon a realization 
and fulfillment of its purposes (maqāasiḍ ) which, in turn, is identified on 
the basis of a legal theory methodology that hermeneutically privileges an 
ethico-religious values based approach to the interpretation of the Qurʾān 
and sunna mentioned above. The ethico-religious valued and maqasid 
based approaches to Islamic legal philosophy and Qurʾānic hermeneutics, 
therefore, are very closely hermeneutically interrelated. As noted by Kamali, 
they are derived from the idea that the laws and the teachings of the Qurʾān 
and sunna, both in the realm of muʾāmalāt (civil transactions) and the 
ʿibādāt (rituals) are in essence goal oriented and rational (taʾlilī) in 
nature.6 
wealth among the rich only (59:7). On the appropriateness of interpreting sacred texts in 
terms of authorial-intent discourse in the Christian tradition, see Wolterstorff, Divine Dis-
course; T. Longman, ‘‘Literary Approaches to Biblical Interpretation,’’ in Foundations of 
Contemporary Interpretation, eds. Philips Long et al. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan 
Publishing House, 1996). In context of the Islamic tradition see Hashim Kamali, Moham-
mad Hashim Kamali, Maqasid Al Shariʾah and ijtihad as Instruments of Civilisational 
Renewal: A Methodological Perspective, Islam and Civilisational Renewal, 2,2, (2010): 
245–271. 
4 Jasser Auda, Maqasid Al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law, London, International 
Institute for Islamic Thought, 2008.
5 This theory is known as ethical objectivism according to which there are real qualities 
or relations of acts that make them right independent of opinions of people or Revelation. 
This is to be contrasted with ethical subjectivism according to which ethical value terms 
mean only what is approved or disapproved, commanded, or forbidden by God. In terms 
of legal theory (usūl ul-fiqh) this would translate into a view that all ethico-moral and legal 
rules must ultimately be derived from prescriptions enunciated by God. See G. Hourani, 
‘Ethical Presuppositions of the Qurʾān’, Muslim World, 70 (1980) pp. 1–28.
6 Qurʾānic evidence Kamali provides for taʾlil nature of the Qurʾān and its laws are refer-
ence to the proclamation on just retaliation (qisās) that “in qisas there is (saving of ) life for 
you, you men of understanding” (Q 2:179); the prohibition of wine-drinking and gam-
bling being premised on the rationale of preventing “hostility and rancor” among people 
and interference with the remembrance of God (Q 5:91). Legal alms and charities are 
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I argue that the development of any Islamic legal theory (and therefore 
Qurʾānic hermeneutics) must recognize that, firstly, the Qurʾān does not 
provide a systematic, ahistorical and comprehensive system of universal 
ethics that can be simply retrieved or discovered but that some principles 
of universalist ethics/morality can be deduced or derived based upon the 
Qurʾān’s ‘comprehensive contextualisation’ and a view that Islamic law and 
its philosophy is essentially purposive in nature. By comprehensive contex-
tualization I mean investigating, in a methodical manner, the role of con-
text in shaping of the very content of the Qurʾān and its worldview. For 
this to take place we need to recognize the Qurʾān’s orientation towards the 
assumed operational discourse of its revelational context that manifests 
itself in the Qurʾānic content and is reflected in the grammatical and syn-
tactical structures employed in the Qurʾān’s language. This Qurʾānically 
assumed operational discourse must be seen as often reflecting the preva-
lent religious, cultural, social, political and economic situation of its direct 
audience, its community of listeners and participants upon which a dia-
logical nature of the Qurʾān’s discourse is premised.
It is the task of this article to argue that the development of a new Qurʾān-
sunna hermeneutic and therefore Islamic legal theory which herme-
neutically privileges an ethico-religious values and purposive (maqāsiḍ ) 
approaches to a Qurʾānic interpretation has a potential to engender a more 
gender egalitarian or gender just Islamic legal theory. 
This is not to reduce the task of the entire edifice of Qurʾān-sunna 
hermeneutics to that of the potential discovery of Qurʾānic intentionality 
since this Qurʾānic intentionality driven hermeneutics is hermeneutically 
derived, as I have shown elsewhere,7 on the basis of a particular broader 
Qurʾān-sunna hermeneutic, which includes what I term comprehensive 
contextualization (described above), a particular view of the nature of lan-
guage and revelation that considers Qurʾān, for interpretational purposes, 
as a socio-culturally produced text, a thematic/holistic approach to inter-
pretation of Qurʾān and ḥadith textual indicants based on the principle 
levied in order to prevent the concentration of wealth among the rich (Q 57:7). With refer-
ence even to the prophethood of Muhammad, “We have not sent thee but a mercy to 
mankind” (Q 21:10). Mercy in this verse and communication (Q 5:92) and warning in 
other places (Q 22:49), Hashim Kamali, “Fiqh and Adaptation to Social Reality”, The 
Muslim World, 86/1 (1996), pp. 62–84, p. 76.
7 See Adis Duderija, Constructing A Religiously Ideal Believer and Women in Islam: Neo-
Traditional Salafi and Progressive Muslim Methods of Interpretation (New York: Macmillan, 
2011).
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corroborative induction (istiqrāʾ) that views texts as interwoven web-like 
sets of ideas, a reader oriented determinacy of meaning hermeneutics,8 the 
endorsement of the objective nature of ethical values in revelation and 
epistemological,9 methodological,10 and hermeneutical 11divorcing of the 
sunna from ḥadith.
Additionally, in the first part of the paper I discuss one reason why 
I consider the classical Islamic scholarship failed to develop this approach, 
namely a hermeneutical shift from a dialogical Qurʾān-sunna hermeneutic 
to that of a sunna-ḥadith episteme. 
At the outset it is to be acknowledged that some modern Muslim and 
non Muslim scholars have alluded to what Qurʾān assumes to be norma-
tive by its direct recipients when developing their models of Qurʾānic 
interpretation and/or Islamic legal theory.12 For example, Moosa maintains 
that the Qurʾān without its’ direct recipient audience would cease to be the 
Qurʾān.13 Achrati elsewhere argues that the oral-based culture of the Arab 
beduins strongly influenced the character and the nature of the Qurʾānic 
discourse.14 Similarly Abu Zayd considers that the Qurʾānic discourse 
reflects the dialectical relationship between the Qurʾān and the reality of 
 8 Which highlights the important role of the reader in determining or helping produce 
meaning. In contrast to that of the text or the author and her intention. 
 9 By epistemological divorcing I mean that Sunna and hadith are considered to have 
been perpetuated by different mechanisms having different epistemological values.
10 By methodological divorcing I mean that the compliance of certain theological, legal 
or ethical values, norms or principles with Sunna did not need to be determined by sifting 
through numerous narratives reportedly going back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad 
via a sound chain of narrators (isnād ).
11 By hermeneutical divorcing I mean the distinction made in the function and role 
Sunna and hadith played in the overall theory of interpretation vis a vis the Qurʾān.
12 See, for example, Khaled Abou El-Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Author-
ity and Women, Oxford, Oneworld, 2001; Amina Wadud, Qurʾān and Woman-Rereading 
the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective, 2nd ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999; 
Saeed, Interpreting the Qurʾān, op. cit.; Nasir Abu Zayd, Re-thinking the Qurʾān—Towards a 
Humanistic Hermeneutic, Utrecht, Humanities University Press, 2004; Fazrul Rahman, 
Islam and Modernity: The Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition, Chicago, Chicago Uni-
versity Press, 1982; Hasan Hanafi, Islam in the Modern World, Vol. II Heliopolis, Dar Al 
Kebaa, 2000; Asma Barlas, Believing Women in Islam—Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations 
of the Qurʾān, Austin, University of Texas Press, 2002.
13 Ebrahim Moosa, “The Debt and Burdens of Critical Islam”, in Progressive Muslims: On 
Social Justice, Gender and Pluralism, ed. O. Safi, Oneworld, Oxford, 2003, pp. 111–128.
14 Achmed, Achrati, “Arabic, Qur’ānic Speech and Postmodern Language: What the 
Qurʾān Simply Says,” Arabica, 54/2 (2008), pp. 161–203.
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the early Muslim community.15 Soroush goes even further by asserting that 
the experiential, evolutionary, and dialogical nature of the prophetic expe-
rience had a very significant impact on the nature and the content of the 
revelation itself.16 Neuwirth has similarly noted, the social concerns and 
theological questions of the Qurʾāns first listeners permeate the Qurʾān 
and are reflected in its content.17 Halverson concurs with this by stating 
that the Qurʾān not only addresses its first audience in the particular lan-
guage that they spoke but also the world in which they lived.18 In similar 
fashion, Wright perceptively remarks that: 
The Qurʾān reaches out allusively not simply for the purposes of shaking hands with 
members of its audience, but to activate the power of a prior knowledge it recognizes 
as resident among them.19
This dialectical nature of the Qurʾān in turn is based upon its essential oral-
ity and has important hermeneutical implications.20
None of these studies explicitly investigated the relationship between 
this dialogical nature of the Qurʾānic discourse and the development of 
an Islamic legal theory whose most powerful hermeneutical tool is an 
ethico-religious values and purposive based approach to its interpretation.21 




16 Abdul Kareem Soroush, The Expansion of Prophetic Experience-Essays on Historicity, 
Contingency and Plurality in Religion, tr by N. Mobasser, edited with an analytical intro-
duction by F. Jahanbakhsh, Leiden, Brill, 2009, pp. 3–13, pp. 63–90.
17 Angelika Neuwirth, “Two Faces of the Qurʾān: Qur’ān and Mushaf”, Oral Tradition, 
25/1 (2010), pp. 141–156, p. 144.
18 Jeffrey Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam: The Muslim Brotherhood, 
Asharism and Political Sunnism, (New York :Macmillan, 2010), 134.
19 Peter, M. Wright, “Modern Qur’ānic Hermeneutics”, Ph.D. Thesis, Chapell Hill, 
2008, 155.
20 Angelika Neuwirth, “Two Faces of the Qurʾān: Qurʾān and Mushaf”, Oral Tradition, 
25/1 (2010), pp. 141–156, p. 144.
21 An exception to this would be Hamid Nasir Abu Zayd, “The Nexus of Theory and 
Practice”, in The New Voices of Islam-Rethinking Politics and Modernity, A Reader, ed. 
M. Kamvara, Berkley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2006, pp. 153–176, 
He argues that the value of “justice” embedded in the overall Qur’ānic worldview, ought to 
be considered as its most hermeneutically privileged tool. See also Ahmad Souaiaia, 
Contesting Justice-Women, Islam, Law, and Society, New York, SUNY, 2008, p. 115. On the 
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 Additionally, there are no existing studies that examine how the change in 
the hermeneutical relationship and hierarchy between the Qurʾān and 
sunna, sunna and ḥadith and therefore Qurʾān and ḥadith bodies of knowl-
edge as formulated by the pre-classical and that of the classical Islamic 
scholarship influenced the Islamic scholarship on Islamic legal theory. In 
other words, the question why the Qurʾān has the content it does, includ-
ing various suppositions embedded in its content, and to what extent did 
the given context shape and determine its content has not been systemati-
cally explored. 
Prior to discussing some of the assumptions evident in the Qurʾānic 
content and their interpretational implications a brief discussion of the 
pre-classical and classical hermeneutical hierarchy governing the herme-
neutical relationship between the Qurʾān, sunna and ḥadith bodies of 
knowledge requires some elaboration. This enables us to understand the 
shift from an understanding of a Revelation based on an orally based, sym-
biotic, reason inclusive, ethically objective, values-oriented relationship 
between the Qurʾān and sunna bodies of knowledge that existed during 
the formative period of Islamic thought22 to that of a textually and ḥadith 
dependent, largely reason deductive (i.e. syllogistic or analogical reason), 
non-values based approach to it. Additionally, the knowledge of the mech-
anisms responsible for the above process itself marginalised, if not 
obstructed, the importance of the recognition of Qurʾānic assumptions as 
evident in its content and their hermeneutical function as “pointers” to a 
development of a Qurʾānic hermeneutic and Islamic legal theory founded 
on a purposive ethico-religious values-based-approach as its most herme-
neutically privileged interpretational mechanism. We will first discuss the 
nature of the hermeneutical relationship between Qurʾān and sunna and 
then that of sunna and ḥadith. Since the classical definition of the concept 
of sunna conceptually conflates the ḥadith and sunna bodies of knowledge,23 
importance of these assumptions and the literary devices in the Qurʾānic text employed in 
relation to understanding the nature of the Qurʾān and the development of its hermeneutic 
see, Wright, Modern Qurʾānic Hermeneutics, op. cit.
22 For this see Duderija, Constructing A Religiously Ideal Believer and Woman in Islam, 
op. cit.
23 For a discussion of a classical definition of sunna and the implications it has on the 
nature of hermeneutical relationship between the Qurʾān and sunna and sunna and hadith 
bodies of knowledge see Adis Duderija “A Paradigm Shift in Assessing/Evaluating the Value 
and Significance of hadith in Islamic thought- From ulūm-ul—hadith to usūl-ul-fiqh”, 
Arab Law Quarterly, 23/2 (2009), pp. 195–206.
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we shall also discuss the implications this has on the overall Qurʾānic 
hermeneutic.
A) The Pre-Classical and Classical Views on the Nature of the 
Hermeneutical Relationship between the Qurʾān and Sunna Bodies 
of Knowledge 
The post-formative, classical Islamic scholarship engendered a largely 
ḥadith-based Qurʾān-sunna hermeneutic24 hermeneutically marginalizing 
the importance of the various assumptions evident in the Qurʾānic text 
pertaining to issues relating to ethics, morality, socio-cultural norms and 
gender relations to name but a few. This markedly affected the method-
ological and epistemological parameters within which Qurʾānic interpreta-
tion operated as well as the methodological and epistemological tools, 
which governed its hermeneutic.25 The recent works of Souaiaia have con-
vincingly demonstrated that oral traditions and precedents originating 
from the generations of Companions and Successors were, however, instru-
mental in imparting, assigning and fixing particular meaning/s to the 
written-based sources such as Qurʾān and sunna and were embodied in 
classical jurisprudential doctrines such as abrogation (nash), ʿadl (justice), 
and the practice of the regency of living scholar (marjaʾyya) in Shiʾism.26 I 
do not dispute this fact but merely wish to emphasize the point that the 
Islamic legal theory, as a result of what I call the process of traditionalisa-
tion of the Islamic thought and the ḥadithtification of sunna27 was framed 
and constrained by a progressively increasing written body of knowledge, 
mainly in form of prophetic reports, which were conflated with the con-
cept of sunna and as described below changed the nature and the herme-
neutical character of the Qurʾān-sunna discourse.
During the pre-classical period of Islamic thought the concept of sunna 
was organically linked to that of the Qurʾān and was not considered as an 
24 See Duderija, Constructing A Religiously Ideal Believer and Woman in Islam, op. cit.
25 Ibid.
26 A. Souaiaia, The Function of Orality in Islamic Law and Practices: Verbalizing Meaning, 
Edwin Meller Press, 2006; cf. A. Souaiaia, ‘On the Sources of Islamic Law and Practices’, 
Journal of Law and Religion, 20, 2005, pp. 125–149.
27 Explained in the main text below.
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independent entity.28 This coupling of the Qurʾān and sunna was based on 
two premises. Firstly, it was based on the principle of the Deutungsbeduer-
ftigkeit of the Qurʾān (i.e. its need of/for interpretation) on whose basis its 
distinct ethico-moral (ahlāq), law (  fiqh), and creedal (ʿaqīda) teachings are 
to be deduced and contrasted against the prevalent socio-cultural values, 
worldview assumptions, and norms governing pre-Qurʾānic Arabia. Sec-
ondly, it was based on the need for the practical manifestation of certain 
Qurʾānic injunctions, which are to be carried out in action (ʿamal ) but was 
not described in detail in the Qurʾān (e.g. how to perform prayer, hajj, 
ablution etc.). We refer to these as ritual-based (ʿibāda) or practice-based 
(ʿamal ) components of the Qurʾānic worldview. Therefore, the function 
and scope of the sunna would involve a practical embodiment of the 
Qurʾānic ʿaqīdah, akhlāq, fiqh, and ʿamal/ʿibāda,29 which permeate the 
Qurʾān in the form of the phrase ‘Obey Allah and His Messenger.’ 
This hermeneutically intimate relationship is also noted by Sachedina 
who avers the following: 
Explication of the divine intention of the revelation was among the functions that the 
Qurʾān assigned to the Prophet. The Prophet functioned as the projection of the divine 
message embodied in the Qurʾān. He was the living commentary of the Qurʾān, inex-
tricately related to the revelatory text. Without the Prophet the Qurʾān was incompre-
hensible, just as without the Qurʾān the Prophet was no prophet at all.30
The nature of this conceptually and hermeneutically symbiotic Qurʾān-
Sunna relationship can also be gleaned from the following passage from 
Graham who maintains that:
28 Adis Duderija, “The Evolution in the concept of Sunna during the first four  generations 
of Muslims in relation to the development of the concept of an sound hadith as based on 
recent western scholarship”, Arab Law Quarterly, 26,4, (2012), 393–437. Also see out 
discussion below.
29 Adis Duderija, “Toward a Methodology of the Nature and the Scope of the Concept 
of Sunna’, Arab Law Quarterly, 21/3 (2007), pp. 269–280.The practical embodiment of 
the Qur’ān can be divided into actions that pertain to rituals such as prayers, hajj, fasting, 
etc. which are termed ʿibāda or worship, and non- ritual based actions (muʿāmalāt) 
including commerce, marriage, and charitable deeds of various kinds, etc. 
30 Abdul Aziz Sachedina, “Scriptural Reasoning in Islam”, Journal of Scriptural Reasoning, 
5/1 (2005), n.p.
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It appears [that] for the Companions and the early Followers of the Prophet, the 
divine activity manifested in the mission of Muhammad was a unitary reality in which 
the divine word, the prophetic guidance, and even the example and witness of all who 
participated in the sacred history of the Prophet’s time, were all perceived as comple-
mentary, integral aspects of a single phenomenon.31
Similarly, in his investigation of an early Hanafi jurist, ʿĪsā b. Abān 
(d. 221/836), Bedir asserts that at this time the hierarchy of Qurʾān and 
sunna was not yet clear.32 This unity of “prophetic-revelatory event”, to use 
Graham’s phrase, has from the very beginning and throughout the first 
150 years of the formative Islamic thought reflected the early Muslim 
understanding of the function, nature the scope and the relationship 
between Qurʾān and sunna.33 This interdependent, symbiotic relationship 
between Qurʾān and sunna, therefore, seems to have enjoyed wide-spread 
acceptability in early Islam.
Therefore the Qurʾān and sunna bodies of knowledge existed in what 
we describe as a symbiotic or organically linked relationship. We refer 
to this relationship between Qurʾān and sunna discourses as a Qurʾān-
sunna dynamic to highlight this conceptual,34 epistemological35 and 
hermeneutical36 interdependence between two concepts. 
There are a number of other characteristics that defined the nature of 
the Qurʾān and Sunna during this pre-classical period apart from their 
symbiotic relationship. One such delineating feature is that both concepts 
were primarily understood as being primarily ethico-religious in nature. 
A number of Muslim scholars have argued for the predominantly ethico-
religious character of the Qurʾān and Qurʾānic legislative dimension based 
31 William Graham, Divine Word and Prophetic Word in Early Islam-A Reconsideration of 
the Sources, with Special References to the Divine Saying or Hadith Qudsi, Hague, Mouton, 
1977, p. 15. See also Zafar Ansari, “The Contribution of the Qurʾān and the Prophet to the 
Development of the Islamic Fiqh”, Journal of Islamic Studies, 3/2 (1992), pp. 141–171.
32 Murteza Bedir, “An Early Response to Shafīʾi: ʿĪsā b. Abān on the Prophetic report 
(Khabar)”, Islamic Law and Society, 9, (2002), pp. 285–311, p. 303.
33 Graham, Divine Word and Prophetic Word in Early Islam, p. 12. 
34 By conceptual relationship I mean to what extent were/are Sunna and Qurʾān and 
sunna and hadith considered to constitute same bodies of knowledge.
35 By epistemological relationship I mean to what extent were/are Sunna and Qurʾān 
and sunna and hadith considered to have been perpetuated by same mechanisms having 
same epistemological value.
36 By hermeneutical I mean which function and role did sunna play in the overall theory 
of interpretation vis à vis the Qurʾān and hadith.
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on its overriding concern for the moral conduct of humans37 that trans-
lated itself into Prophetic activity which emphasized a person’s moral 
responsibility and God consciousness rather than positive law  formulation.38 
This nature and the character of the Qurʾānic revelation including its leg-
islative element, embodied by the Prophet, was geared towards certain 
underlying legislative norms which were based on certain ethico-religious 
purposes and objectives.39 In this context, it should come to us as no sur-
prise that one of the ways the concept of Sunna was understood and con-
ceptualised even in the second century Hijri was sunna as a righteous 
practice of Muslims in general (as-sunna al-ʿadīla; jarāt al-Sunna).40
In addition to the ethico-moral nature of the Qurʾān and sunna, the 
interpretation of the Qurʾān and sunna was considered to be reason inclu-
sive and the nature of ethical values in these bodies of knowledge was 
generally considered to be objective. For example, modern scholars of 
Muslim tradition such as Hourani, maintain that the Qurʾān cannot be 
said to completely disregard the value of ʿaql (inherent human reason) in 
forming ethical judgments, while Reinhart asserts that “[T]he Qurʾānic 
message time and again appeals to impartial knowledge that confirms the 
Qurʾānic summons.”41 Moreover, argues Reinhart, ʿaql ’s explicit Qurʾānic 
endorsement in recognizing God’s existence, Unity and Grandeur is con-
sidered to favour its implicit usage in the realms of ethics and morality.42 
Furthermore, Hourani forms the view that:
Qurʾān and Muhammad both display a common sense attitude and that we should 
not expect either of them to claim that for every ethical judgement he makes a man 
must consult a book or a scholar, or work out an analogy when the book or scholar 
give no direct answer to the Problem.43
37 In this context Ansari following remarks are quite pertinent: ’Qurʾānic legislation dif-
fers from legal codes in form as well as in spirit and purpose. Its basic motivation is religious 
and moral rather than ‘legal’ in a narrow sense of the term. Its aim is to lay down certain 
standards of conduct that are intrinsically good and conducive to the good pleasure of God. 
Ansari,  “The Contribution of the Qurʾān”, p. 143.
38 Or more precisely legal norms were conceived more in ethico-religious terms. 
39 Ansari, “The Contribution of the Qurʾān”, pp. 144–146. 
40 Ansari, “The Contribution of the Qurʾān”, pp. 103–104.
41 Reinhart, K. Before Revelation—The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought. Albany, 
State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 178.
42 G. Hourani, “Ethical Presuppositions of the Qurʾān”, Muslim World, 70 /1 (1980), 
pp. 1–28, p. 25.
43 Ibid., p. 23.
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In his exhaustive investigation of the moral world of the Qurʾān, Draz 
echoes this view by concluding that, according to the Qurʾānic moral 
world, the human consciousness is prior to Revelation and that it is capa-
ble of divorcing right from wrong without it.44 A further argument, which 
gives credence to the objective nature of ethical values in the Qurʾān, refers 
to its assumptions regarding the meaning and the usage of moral princi-
ples. In the famous Qurʾānic maxim of enjoying the good (maʿrūf   ) and 
forbidding the evil (munkar), which forms the basis for political gover-
nance of a Muslim state, El-Fadl argues that the word maʿrūf means that 
which is commonly known to be good. “Goodness, in the Qurʾānic dis-
course, is part of what one may call a lived reality-it is a product of human 
experience, and constructed normative understandings.”45
A final characteristic that influenced the nature of the Qurʾān-sunna 
relationship in pre-classical Islam was the Qurʾān’s essential discursive, oral 
and rhetorical nature.46 According to Abu Zayd, “Qurʾān was an outcome 
of dialogue, debate, augment, acceptance and rejection, both with the pre-
Islamic norms, practices and culture, and with its own previous assess-
ments, presuppositions and assertions.”47 Sunna reflects this discursive 
nature of the Qurʾān itself and is therefore, part from its ‘ibadat element, 
an ethco-religious, dynamic and not a reified, textually-fixed concept.
Apart from these considerations pertaining to the nature and character 
of the Qurʾān and sunna and their relationship, as convincingly demon-
strated by Souaiaia, interpretative strategies that were based on the primacy 
of oral-based sources permitted an epistemologically and methodologically 
more flexible and fluid interpretive framework that often authorised inter-
pretations of the Qurʾānic enunciations that were contradictory to its lit-
eral meaning and were based on the principle of the Qurʾān’s (and sunna’s) 
overall purpose and objective/s (qasḍ/maqāasiḍ ) or that of maslaḥa (social 
expediency).48 For example, Islamic law pertaining to inheritance often 
diverges from explicit Qurʾānic enunciations based on these consider-
ations. Several well known jurisprudential decisions made by the second 
44 M.A. Draz, The Moral World of the Qurʾān, London, I.B. Taurus, 2008.
45 Khaled Abou El-Fadl, “The Place of Ethical Obligations in Islamic Law”, UCLA 
J. Islamic and Near E.L., 4/1 ( 2005), pp. 1–40.
46 A. Neuwirth, Two Faces of the Qur’ān: Qur’ān and Mushaf, Oral Tradition, 25, 1, 
pp. 141–156.
47 Hamid Abu Zayd, Reformation of Islamic Thought-A Critical Historical Analysis, 
Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2006, p. 99.
48 Souaiaia, The Function of Orality, op. cit. Also Auda, Maqasid Al-Shariʾah, op. cit.
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caliph ʿUmar Al Khattab that contradicted the literal Qurʾānic injunctions 
of the practice of the Prophet are also suggestive of the nature of the 
Qurʾān-sunna as described above.49 Table one below presents a summary of 
the discussion so far.
Table One: The hermeneutical relationship between the Qurʾān and 
the sunna and the Qurʾān and the ḥadith bodies of knowledge during 





formative period (up 








oriented; values based 
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non-hadith based, based 
on ethico-religious values 

















49 A. Souaiaia, “On the Sources of Islamic Law and Practices”, Journal of Law and 
Religion, 20/1 (2005), pp. 125–149, pp. 134–140.
50 As above the Qur’an and sunna bodies of knowledge consist of four aspects: ʿaqīda, 
ahlaq, fiqh and ʿamal/ ʿibāda. 
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During the classical period of Islamic thought, however, the process of 
traditionalisation of the Islamic thought and the “ḥadithtification” of 
sunna51 changed the nature of the hermeneutical relationship between the 
Qurʾān and sunna bodies of knowledge as summarised in table three. By 
“ḥadithification” of sunna I mean that the written ḥadith body of knowl-
edge became to be seen by some Muslim scholars, mainly belonging to the 
Shafiʾi and Habali madhahib, as epistemologically sunna’s only vehicle of 
transmission/embodiment. By ḥadithification of sunna I also refer to the 
process of the development of a ḥadith-dependent methodology of deriva-
tion of sunna. By methodologically ḥadith dependent concept of sunna, 
I wish to convey the idea that among some Muslim scholars emerged a 
view that the sunna compliance (or otherwise) of certain legal, ethical or 
theological practices, values or norms is and can only be determined by 
sifting through numerous narratives reportedly going back to the time of 
the Prophet Muhammad via an sound chain of narrators (isnād ).
I define traditionalisation of Islamic thought as those social, political 
and jurisprudential mechanisms, which throughout the second century of 
Hijri contributed to:
• The continued growth and proliferation of ḥadith, 
•  The increased perceived importance given to ḥadith at the cost of the 
ethico-religious and ʿamal-based concept of sunna, 
•  The articulation of practically and other non verbally52—based sunna 
into individual sound ḥadith, 
•  The increased application of ḥadith in Qurʾānic and sunnaic sciences 
such as usūl-ul-din, tafsīr, usūl-ul-fiqh and usūl-as-sunna, and
•  The development of hierarchical, semi-contextualist legal hermeneuti-
cal models that were entirely textually-based (i.e. based on Qurʾān 
and ḥadith) and marginalisation of non-textually based epistemolog-
ico-methodological tools of sunna (and Qurʾān) such as notion 
51 This would exclude some of the Hanafi and Maliki fuqaha/usuliyyun for whom the 
concept of sunna remained epistemologically independent of the concept of sound hadith. 
On Maliki madhhab see Umar F. Abd-Allah Wymann Landgraf, Malik and Medina-Islamic 
Reasoning in the Formative Period, (Brill, Leiden: 2013), forthcoming. For Hanafis see 
V. I. Stodolsky, A New Historical Model and Periodization for the Perception of the Sunna 
and his Companions, (Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 2012). 
52 Such as the idea that Sunna represented and embodied certain abstract ethico-
religious principles and norms.
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of ra’y, istiḥsān and ijtihād or the view that sunna was conceptually 
coterminous with certain ethical values or principles such as justice or 
righteous conduct including the expression sunna al-ʿadīla that was 
employed by Muslims in the second century Hijri.53
Resultantly, the nature and the character of the Qurʾān and sunna were 
increasingly legalistic, edified and the nature of the ethical values was based 
on the principal of ethical voluntarism rather than objectivism. Other 
changes that occurred in the classical period will be discussed below in the 
context of ḥadith body of knowledge.
Table Two:54 The hermeneutical relationship between the Sunna and 
the Qurʾān and sunna and the ḥadith bodies of knowledge during the 
pre-classical and classical periods of Islamic thought.55
Body of knowledge: 
Sunna55
Pre-classical or 
formative period (up 








oriented; values based 
on ethical objectivism 
principle, law a minor 
component, reason 
inclusive, not-restricted 
to the authority of the 
Prophet only but also 
to Companions or 
to certain abstract 
principles such as justice
Law-based, edified, 
largely reason-exclusive, 
values based on ethical 
voluntarism, largely 
restricted to the 




Oral and written Primarily written
53 See Ansari, Z.I. ‘Islamic Juristic Terminology before Shafiʾi: A Semantical Analysis 
with Special Reference to Kufa’. Arabica, xix, 1972.
54 Based on Duderija, “The Evolution of the concept of Sunna”, op. cit.
55 Since based on a symbiotic relationship with the Quʾan same as for Qurʾanic body of 
knowledge as outlined in the main text above.
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Body of knowledge: 
Sunna
Pre-classical or 
formative period (up 
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B) The Pre-Classical and Classical Views of the Nature of the 
Hermeneutical Relationship between the Ḥadith and Sunna and 
Ḥadith and Qurʾān Bodies of Knowledge 
During the tadwīn period the above-defined process of “ḥadithtification” 
of sunna was taking place which further contributed to the above men-
tioned traditionalisation of Islamic thought. In the pre-tadwīin era sunna 
was understood to exist in what I termed a hermeneutically symbiotic rela-
tionship with the Qurʾān and was conceptually (i.e. epistemologically, 
methodologically and hermeneutically) divorced from ḥadith. With the 
process of conceptual conflation of ḥadith and sunna among some Muslim 
scholars (excluding some Hanafi and Maliki jurists),59 the nature of the 
56 ʿAmal or practised based sunna that includes the ʿibādāt such as prayer and hajj. Non-
ʿamal based aspects are based on a particular Qurʾanic hermeneutic.
57 This would exclude the concept of Sunna among some Hanafi and Maliki jurists 
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hermeneutical relationship between the Qurʾān and sunna and sunna and 
ḥadith bodies of knowledge changed. As a result of this process the nature 
and the character of the Qurʾān and sunna also changed and they became 
increasingly legalistic and edified. Importantly, this phenomenon also 
changed the way in which the nature of the Qurʾān-sunnaic ethical values 
was understood shifting from the one based on the principal of ethical vol-
untarism to that of ethical objectivism.60 Additionally, having been increas-
ingly (but not entirely) conceptually conflated with the concept of a sound 
ḥadith, the concept of sunna changed both epistemologically and method-
ologically and the concept of a sound ḥadith was considered the main vehicle 
of sunna’s transmission and embodiment among some Muslim scholars.61
Four main factors seemed to have provided the impetus for the forces of 
traditionalisation and the process of “ḥadithification” of sunna in the sec-
ond half of the first century hijri. They included:
•  A general perception that the expanding Muslim empire would 
become organically detached from the Qurʾānic and sunnaic teach-
ings was becoming wide spread, thus a need for a systematic develop-
ment of Islamic thought, especially law arose; 
•  The partisan tensions that emerged within the nascent Muslim com-
munity that brought serious schisms based on conflicting claims 
regarding successorship to Prophet’s political authority;
•  Certain theological controversies prevalent at the time;
•  Gradual transition from oral to written based transmission of 
knowledge.62
These trends resulted firstly in the concept of sunna being increasingly clad 
in the mantle of a written-based, predominantly purely Prophetic sunna, 
and secondly in the development of more stringent mechanisms in estab-
lishing the soundness validity of written-based sunna, especially in terms of 
the mode of its transmission, i.e. ulūm-ul-isnād, which further contributed 
to the ḥadithification of sunna by (supposedly) making in more sound.63 
60 Duderija, “Evolution in the Concept of Sunna”, op. cit.
61 Ibid. For exceptions see fn 51 and 52.
62 Duderija, Constructing a Religiously Ideal ‘Believer’ and ‘Women’ in Islam, op. cit., see 
chapter one in particular.
63 A. Duderija, “The evolution in the canonical Sunni Hadith body of literature and the 
Concept of an Sound hadith During the Formative Period of Islamic Thought as Based on 
Recent Western Scholarship”, Arab Law Quarterly, 23 (2009): 1–27.
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Having been conceptually conflated with the concept of a sound ḥadith, 
the concept of sunna changed in several ways as summarized in the table 
below.
Table Three:64 The hermeneutical relationship between the ḥadith 
body of knowledge and the Qurʾān and sunna during the pre-classical 
and classical periods of Islamic thought65
Body of knowledge: 
Hadith
Pre-classical or 
formative period (up 






awāil /anecdotes put in 
circulation by qusass, 
tarhīb wa targhīb genre, 
All comprehensive, no 
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ethico-moral and legal; 
Law-based, edified, 
largely reason-exclusive, 
values based on ethical 
voluntarism, largely 
restricted to the 




Oral and written Primarily written
Epistemological 
validity









and sunna conceptually 
different bodies of 
knowledge, hadith as 
primary hermeneutical 
and exegetical tool 
therefore the breaking 
of the symbiotic 
relationship between 
Qurʾān and sunna
64 Based on ibid.
65 As based on work of Souaiaia as cited in footnotes 20 and 21.
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Body of knowledge: 
Hadith
Pre-classical or 
formative period (up 


















Importantly, the above mentioned hermeneutically interdependent and 
symbiotic relationship between the Qurʾān and sunna was severed as the 
Qurʾān, and therefore Islamic legal theory, became increasingly hermeneu-
tically dependent upon the ḥadith body of knowledge. This changed the 
nature and the character of the Qurʾān (and sunna) bodies of knowledge, 
the way its/their worldview was conceptualised and most significantly 
for the purposes of this article, the way in which the interpreters approached 
the Qurʾānic for the purposes of its interpretation. Namely, the above pro-
cesses shifted the interpreters’ focus away from the actual text, its dialogical 
and purposive nature,67 and the assumptions governing its revelational 
context to that of interpreting it through the lens of extra-Qurʾānic sources 
of knowledge, mainly in the form of ḥadith.68 This is one reason why 
I consider that the classical Islamic Legal theory did not sufficiently exam-
ine the importance of textual pre-suppositions evident in the Qurʾānic 
66 Again, exception would be some Hanafi and Maliki scholars. See footnotes 51 and 52.
67 For example, ibn Ashur, a contemporary proponent of such an approach argues that 
pre-modern usūl legal theories: disregard[ed] the purposes of the law, not including them 
in the fundamentals [of Islamic legal methodology], and merely studying them in a partial 
way within sections of analogical reasoning, under appropriateness and unrestricted inter-
ests, even thought they were supposed to be the fundamental of the fundamentals. Tahir 
Al-Ashur, Alaysa al-Subh bi Qarib? Al-Shakirah al-Tunisiyyah li-funun al-rasm, Tunis, 
1988, p. 237.
68 Hence the development of tafsīr al-maʾthūr genre.
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discourse as they manifest themselves in its actual text and what the herme-
neutical implications of these suppositions are.69
More specifically, in relation to issues surrounding the role and status of 
women in Muslim societies, which is one of our case studies to be dis-
cussed below, other factors which contributed to at times androcentric and 
at times very patriarchal interpretations of the Qurʾān and sunna, apart 
from the methodological and hermeneutical mechanisms mentioned 
above, include the nature of interpretative communities (namely over-
whelmingly male community of interpreters operating within an andro-
centric/patriarchal socio-cultural and historical context) and the nature of 
political and sexual power during the formative period of Islam.70 Since 
these have been discussed in some detail in other studies they will not be 
elaborated upon here.71
The aim of the rest of this paper is to identify some of these assumptions 
present in the Qurʾānic discourse and the implications they have on the 
development of a Qurʾānic hermeneutic and Islamic legal theory whose 
most hermeneutically powerful mechanisms is an ethico-religious values 
and purposive-based approach to interpretation.
Before these pre-suppositions are considered, a few preliminary remarks 
as to how they manifest themselves in the Qurʾānic text are necessary.
C) Qurʾānic Textual Assumptions and their Hermeneutical 
Implications
As we shall see below manifestations of Qurʾānic assumptions are evident 
in its usage (to its direct audiences) of familiar concepts (e.g. sunna, Allah),
69 Several recent studies on the historical development of Islamic Law have argued that 
Qur’ān reflects the greater ethico-legal trends that were embedded in the late antiquity 
Near Eastern religions. See Wael Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005; Hina Azam, Sexual Violence in Maliki Legal 
Ideology-From Discursive Foundations to Classical Articulation, Ph.D. thesis, Duke University, 
2007; W. Young, Stoning and Hand-Amputation-The pre-Islamic origins of the hadd penalties 
for zina and sariqa, MA Thesis, McGill Univeristy, 2005. 
70 Generally on this among many see Ahmed, L. Women and Gender in Islam, Yale Uni-
versity Press, London, 1992. A. Barlas, Believing Women in Islam-Unreading Patriarchal 
Interpretations of the Qurʾān. University of Texas Press, Austin, 2002. Also, Abou El Fadl, 
Speaking in God’s Name, op. cit. Wadud, Qurʾān and Woman, op. cit., Duderija, Constructing 
a Religiously Ideal ‘Believer’ and ‘Woman’ in Islam, op. cit.
71 See ibid.
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peoples stories/people (e.g. story of various Prophet’s such as Lut, Noah, 
Abraham etc.),72 beliefs (angels, scriptures, etc.), ethical terms (e.g. maʾrūf, 
sharr, ḥasan ) and the use of particular words/phrases/grammatical/ philo-
logical constructs (e.g. the primary Qurʾānic addressees are assumed to be 
male, hence, the believers are primarily addressed as muʾminūn, i.e. second 
person plural male).73 Halverson aptly summarizes the reason for this, who 
in this context asserts:
The Qurʾān employs a set of existing religious ideas, themes, and concepts, or what 
some scholars refer to as an existing body of “religious knowledge,” while simultane-
ously extracting and modifying certain elements necessary to successfully transfer 
these characters and traditional narratives into the service of the text and reinforce its 
fundamental precepts (e.g., al-tawḥīd ).74 
In order to make a better sense of these assumptions, we shall categories 
them into two groups, namely socio-cultural and ethico-moral.
I) Socio-Cultural Suppositions—The Case of Patriarchy
One of the most evident assumptions evident in a majority of the passages 
in the Qurʾān is the existence of an all-embracing patriarchy75 existing in 
its historically revelatory milieu.76 Husband’s right to unilateral dissolution 
of marriage, known as tạlāq, is one aspect of this patriarchal milieu. Accord-
ing to Joseph Schacht: 
The right to a one-sided dissolution of a marriage belonged to the man exclusively, 
among the pre-Islamic Arabs. Long before Mu ḥammad, this tạlāq was in general use 
72 Not all aspects of stories in the Qurʾān were known to either the Prophet or his direct 
audience but their existence and general outlines were certainly known since a number of 
Jews and Christians lived in the area. For more on this, among many, see e.g. Keneth Cragg, 
The Event of the Qurʾān—Islam in its Scripture, Oxford, Oneworld, 1971; Arthur Jeffery, 
Qurʾān as Scripture, Russel Moore Company, New York, 1952.
73 And only on rare occasions the female gender equivalents are mentioned.
74 Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, 140.
75 There are many definitions of patriarchy but in our case we shall define it as control/
rule of fathers/men over women at each/or some levels of society, (e.g. family, public life in 
terms socially acceptable norms and behaviours ), law (e.g. family law)and politics (partaking 
in having a say in which a society is run).
76 Which does not imply that Qurʾān is necessary or in essence a patriarchal text. In fact 
the Qurʾān can sustain multiple interpretations some of which can be seen as being anti-
patriarchal. For example, Barlas, Believing Women in Islam-Unreading, op. cit. For a contrary 
view See Souaiaia, Contesting Justice, p. 115 in particular.
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among the Arabs and meant the immediate definite abandonment by the man of all 
rights over his wife, which he could insist upon as a result of his marriage.77
At the philological level this patriarchal revelation context is evident in the 
Qurʾānic injunctions, which are exclusively directed at men in matters per-
taining to divorce and marriage. For example, Qurʾān78 (65:1–2) instructs 
the Prophet that if the men divorce their women (tạlāqtumu nisāʾ) they 
should allow women to reside in their marital home during their ʿidda 
(waiting period) and then instructs men to keep or stay with their wives in 
dignity or you divorce them in kindness and dignity.”79 In the pre-modern 
Qur’ānic commentary (tafsīr) literature that I consulted (Suyūti, Ibn 
ʿAbbas, Al Qurtubi, At—Tabari, Al-Zamakhshari, Ibn Kathīr, and Al-Wā 
ḥidi) on this verse it is evident that all of the exegetes (mufassirūn) consid-
ered that the unilateral right of men to divorce their wives was a ‘pre-given’ 
and ‘natural’ order of things and did not problematize it at all apart from 
emphasizing that although the verse addresses the Prophet it also speaks to 
all the male believers (muʾminūn). Instead they either focused on the dis-
cussions surrounding the ʿidda and/or proper wife’s treatment during this 
time and provided the circumstance for the revelation of the verse (eg. 
Prophet’s divorcing of Hafza or ʿAbd Allah Ibn ʿUmar divorcing his wife 
when she had menses).80
Qurʾān (2:230) stipulates that if a man divorces a woman (  fa inn tạlāq 
-ha) irrevocably, a man cannot remarry her until she is married to another.81 
Again as in the case of tafsīr of 65:1 the same pre-modern exegetes simply 
assume the validity of unilateral tạlāq being the sole prerogative of men 
and clarify that in this case fa inna tạlāqa-ha means the third divorce after 
which the husband cannot re-marry the same woman prior to her  marrying 
77 J. Schacht, J. and A. Layish, “Ṭalāḳ (a.).” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. 
Edited by: P. Bearman; Th. Bianquis; C.E. Bosworth; E. van Donzel; and W.P. Heinrichs. 
Brill, 2012. Brill Online. University of Melbourne. 18 January 2012.
78 Y. Ali’s translation of the Qurʾān is used here.
79 O Prophet! When ye do divorce women, divorce them at their prescribed periods, and 
count (accurately), their prescribed periods: And fear Allah your Lord: and turn them not 
out of their houses, nor shall they (themselves) leave . . . (65:1) Thus when they fulfil their 
term appointed, either take them back on equitable terms or part with them on equitable 
terms . . . (65:2).
80 The tafasir are available here: http://mosshaf.com/web/.
81 So if a husband divorces his wife (irrevocably), He cannot, after that, re-marry her 
until after she has married another husband and He has divorced her.
80 A. Duderija / HAWWA 11 (2013) 58–87
another man and having sexual intercourse with him and waiting for the 
ʿidda period to be completed. Some also document the occasions (asbāb) 
of the revelation about a woman who was divorced by her husband and 
married another man and wished to return to her first previous husband.
Again, in 33:49 the male believers are told that if they married believing 
women and then divorced them (tạlāqtumuhunna) before touching them, 
they do not need to count the ʿidda.82 As far as tāfāsīr go the same analysis 
applies to this verse as in the case of 65:1 and 2:230 above. Namely, the 
assumption of husband’s unilateral right to divorce is assumed.
Similarly, in 2:236 men (masculine second person plural- tạlāqtumu 
nisāʾ) are, in case of divorcing women before consummating marriage, told 
to bestow gifts upon them.83
It seems that, at least in these instances,84 decisions pertaining to both 
men and women in relation to divorce and related matters have been sur-
rendered entirely to men and that women play only a derivative and non-
autonomous role.
The famous qawwama (4:34)85 and its ‘sister’ verse (2:228)86 verse which 
bestows upon men a qualified degree (darajāt) over women based on the 
male’s socially privileged role of breadwinners including the right to 
82 O ye who believe! When ye marry believing women, and then divorce them before ye 
have touched them, no period of ʿIddat have ye to count in respect of them: so give them a 
present. And set them free in a handsome manner.
83 There is no blame on you if ye divorce women before consummation or the fixation 
of their dower; but bestow on them (A suitable gift), the wealthy according to his means, 
and the poor according to his means. 
84 However, in cases dealing with spiritual or religious matters such as those pertaining 
to salvation and the Hereafter, the Qurʾān is gender egalitarian.
85 Men are the protectors and maintainers of women (ar rijalu qawwamuna ‘ala nisa’), 
because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support 
them from their means . . . It is interesting that some of the mufassirun (e.g. Zamakhshari) 
have given example of the husband’s unilateral right to divorce his wife as one of the reasons 
why men are qawwamuna over women. Like in other verses discussed in the main text 
above the vast majority of the mufassrun did not question the basic underlying premise of 
men’s qiwama although some did link it to, among other religious or ‘naturally’ inherent 
reasons, to the issue of mahr. For more on Karen Bauer, “Room for Interpretation: Qurʾānic 
Exegesis and Gender” (Princeton University, Ph.D. thesis, unpublished, 2008).
86 . . . And women shall have rights similar to the rights against them, according to what 
is equitable; but men have a degree (of advantage) over them. 
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 physically punish (daraba)87 recalcitrant (nushuz)88 women can be consid-
ered as another aspect of the patriarchal revelational milieu mirrored in the 
Qurʾān at the level of socio-cultural rights/rules. The same would also 
apply to the inheritance verses in surat-ul-Nisāʾ which stipulate unequal 
shares/proportions to men and women (in favour of men)89 or the tribal 
practice of taking the women and children of defeated tribes as spoils of 
war that is indirectly referred to in the Qurʾān and was the practice at the 
time of the Prophet. 
What I wish to highlight for the purposes of the present paper is that all 
of the above examples pre-suppose the existence of a social and cultural 
order which confers the right to entering into marriage [contract], divorce, 
physical punishment, disciplining and even possession of women (as in 
case of slavery- as shall be demonstrated below) solely to men, the reality 
of which is assumed, acknowledged and addressed by the Qurʾān. How-
ever, does this necessarily mean that Qurʾān endorses the same powers to 
men or does it attempt to mitigate and limit them? 
If we examine carefully the above stated verses pertaining to divorce or 
marriage matters in general, as El-Fadl astutely observes, they all were per-
forming the function of “protecting women from the power of men [they] 
already possess[ed] by the virtue of the customs and practices of the society 
in which Islam was revealed.”90 Abu Zayd furthermore argues that based 
on the semantical and historical analyses of this verse it would be safe to 
assert that this Qurʾānic injunction’s primary aim is to limit the rights 
of men that existed in the patriarchal and tribal-based social, economic, 
87 On the significant prevalence of physical violence against women among the Muslim 
community during the life of Prophet Muhammad see Manuela Marín, “Disciplining Wives: 
A Historical Reading of Qurʾân 4:34”, Studia Islamica, 97 (2003), 5–40. Cf. Ayesha S. 
Chaudry, “Wife-Beating in the Pre-Modern Islamic Tradition: An Inter-Disciplinary Study 
of Ḥadīth, Qurʾanic Exegesis and Islamic Jurisprudence”, ( Ph.D thesis, New York Univer-
sity, 2009). Chaudry states for example that both “Qurʾanic exegesis and Islamic jurispru-
dence assume a husband’s right to discipline his wife and the ethical deliberations therein 
are concerned only with the procedure of hitting”, viii.
88 On wife nushuz see Chaudry, Wife-Beating, op. cit., 184–202.
89 See Qurʾān 4: 11–12. For a detailed discussion of inheritance verses in relation to 
women from the Qurʾānic and classical Islamic law perspectives see Souaiaia, The Function 
of Orality, op. cit. and A. Souaiaia, Contesting Justice—Women, Islam, Law, and Society, State 
University of New York Press, Albany, 2008.
90 Khaled Abou El-Fadl, “The Pearls of Beauty”, in his A Search for Beauty in Islam: The 
Conference of the Books, Rowman and Littlefield, University of America Press, 2001, 
p. 275.
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cultural and political reality of the Qurʾānic revelational milieu, rather 
than stipulate absolute inheritance portions.91 Additionally, argues El-Fadl 
the Qurʾānic verses 65:692 and 2:22993 could be used to argue for this 
mitigating effect of Qurʾānic injunctions. 94 The same mitigating effect 
applies to the concept of sunna.95 But is this mitigating process an end in 
itself or just a means to a more just end? 
If this principle of the Qurʾānic textual assumption of certain patriar-
chal practices prevalent in its milieu and their subsequent mitigation on 
the basis of other relevant Qurʾānic verses was recognised as a hermeneuti-
cal tool on the basis of which a moral trajectory could be extrapolated this 
would contribute towards the development of an ethico-religious values 
and purposive based Qurʾānic hermeneutic. This is exactly what Abu Zayd 
argues when suggesting that all the legal injunctions in the Qurʾān96 are to 
91 Abu Zayd, “The Nexus of Theory and Practice”, pp. 164–165.
92 Let the women live (in ʿiddat) in the same style as ye live, according to your means: 
Annoy them not, so as to restrict them. And if they carry (life in their wombs), then spend 
(your substance) on them until they deliver their burden: and if they suckle your (off-
spring), give them their recompense: and take mutual counsel together, according to what 
is just and reasonable. And if ye find yourselves in difficulties, let another woman suckle 
(the child) on the (father’s) behalf.
93 A divorce is only permissible twice: after that, the parties should either hold Together 
on equitable terms, or separate with kindness. It is not lawful for you, (Men), to take back 
any of your gifts (from your wives), except when both parties fear that they would be 
unable to keep the limits ordained by Allah. If ye (judges) do indeed fear that they would 
be unable to keep the limits ordained by Allah, there is no blame on either of them if she 
gives something for her freedom. These are the limits ordained by Allah; so do not trans-
gress them if any do transgress the limits ordained by Allah, such persons wrong (Them-
selves as well as others).
94 Verses such as 2:227; 2;230 and 4:35 which address both parties in marriage suggest 
that there was “an incremental empowerment of women” scheme unfolding in the Qurʾān, 
El-Fadl, “The Pearls of Beauty”, p. 275. 
95 Madeleine Fletcher, “How Can We Understand Islamic Law Today?”, Journal of Islam 
and Christian-Muslim Relations, 17/2 (2006), pp. 159–172. In this context she states: 
“Prophet’s mission is not correctly indicated by reified content of Islamic Law but rather by 
the direction of his reforms”, and more specifically to issues pertaining to women “Proph-
et’s message with respect to the Arab sunna must be clearly understand to benefit women 
and to reform the existing practices extremely prejudicial to women.” Ibid., p. 163 and 
p. 165.
96 These legal injunctions mentioned in the Qurʾān, according to Abu Zayd, ought not 
to be considered to actually be Qurʾānic. The only purely or solely Qurʾānic values are those 
that have been initiated by the Qur’ān. He also adds that, based on this criterion none of 
the Qurʾānic injunctions pertaining to punishments (hudūd ), inheritance or divorce laws 
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be hermeneutically interpreted so that they are in accordance with the 
hermeneutically most powerful Qurʾānic value of justice. In this context 
the words of Al-Alwāni are instructive, who makes a following observation 
in relation to the question of female witnesses in the Qurʾān:
By establishing a role for a women in the witnessing of transactions, even though at 
the time of revelation they had little to do with such matters, the Qurʾān seeks to give 
concrete form to the idea of women as participant . . . The objective is to end the tra-
ditional perception by including them, among such are acceptable to you as witness’ . . . 
the matter of witnessing served merely as a means to an end or a practical way of 
establishing the concept of gender equality.97
This concept of a moral trajectory was not used as a hermeneutical tool of 
highest order by the majority classical Islamic interpreters of the Qurʾān 
and legal theorists because the interpretational or hermeneutical implica-
tions of these presuppositions embedded within the Qurʾānic text were not 
fully acknowledged and applied hermeneutically. However, as perceptively 
recognized by a young Tunisian thinker Shaykh Al Tahir Al Haddād 
(1901–1935) “there is no textual evidence or proof that suggests that what 
had gradually been achieved in the life of the prophet, is the final goal after 
which there is no further purpose; as long as those matters that are con-
nected with gradualism continue to present difficulties then it is appropri-
ate to eliminate such hardship.”98
One of the reasons for this hermeneutical ‘failure’ of classical Islamic 
scholarship forms the subject matter of this very article, namely the shift 
from a dialogical, symbiotic and ethico-religious and purposive nature of 
early Qurʾān-sunna hermeneutic to that of its sunna-ḥadith episteme.99 
(i.e. those that differentiate on the basis of gender or social status in general) are Qurʾānic 
or divine imperative as they were not initially established by the Qurʾān, Rather they reflect 
the historical and cultural norms within which Qurʾān was revealed and initially operated. 
The Qurʾān initially operated within this context, argues Abu Zayd further, in order that its 
immediate addressees would ‘get’ or comprehend its ultimate message which is theological 
and moral in nature. Elevating this historical aspect of the Qurʾān to divine status or at the 
expense of the divine and perennial Qurʾānic values such as justice, argues Abu Zayd, 
would violate the actual Word of God. “The Nexus of Theory and Practice, pp. 154–167.
97 Taha Al-Alwani, Issues in Contemporary Islamic Thought, London, International 
Institute of Islamic Thought, 2005.
98 Al Tahir Al Haddad, Kalima Shukr, reproduced in Al Tahir Al Haddad (Al Haj Yahya 
and Al Marzuqi editions, n.d.), 16.
99 Cf. Abu Zayd, “The Nexus Between Theory and Practice”, op. cit. Souaiaia has also 
adduced evidence to argue that even the classical Islamic law and legal theory has 
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This resulted in a formulation and subsequent canonisation of a legal and 
socio-cultural tradition based primarily on a ḥadith-based Qurʾān-sunna 
hermeneutic which contained several misogynist and gender discrimina-
tive practices clearly disadvantaging Muslim women.100 In the context of 
discussing the penal code (ḥudūd ) as it appears in the Qurʾān Abu Zayd 
makes exactly this point by averring that:
Through my research and study I have concluded that the Qurʾānic objectives that 
jurists long ago agreed upon were deduced from the penal code alive and well during 
the seventh century on the Arabian Peninsula. The objectives were not deduced from 
looking at the paradigm of the entire Qurʾān.101
II) Ethical/Moral Assumptions—the Case of Free Individuals vs. Slaves Social 
Stratification
Although slavery is a social ill, its repugnance is certainly moral in nature. 
The existence of slavery (including female sex slavery and female concubi-
nage) is another socio-cultural reality that Qurʾān assumes as a culturally 
accepted as evident in for example in Sura An-Nisāʾ.102
In the pre-Qurʾānic Arabia it was a common practice that masters 
(almost exclusively male) would force their (female) concubines into pros-
titution and would not set them free if they (i.e. the concubines) wanted 
to get married in order to live more ‘honourable’ lives. Qurʾān’s attitude 
towards this ill was to make moral appeals to slave owners [exclusively men 
 methodological and hermeneutical mechanisms in place that theoretically could be inter-
preted or construed to uphold the hermeneutical primacy of justice (tahqīq al ʾadalaʾ ) and 
social expediency (masḷaḥa) as its purpose and core but which were never realized as the 
concepts of “justice” and “fairness” did not evolve past the formative period of Islamic 
thought. Souaiaia, Contesting Justice, p. 47.
100 See for example Ziba Mir-Hosseini, “Islam and Gender Justice”, Voices of Islam, 
Volume 5, Voices of Change, eds. V. Cornell, O. Safi and V. Henry, Connecticut and 
London, Westport, 2007, pp. 85–113.
101 Abu Zayd, “The Nexus Between Theory and Practice”, p. 154.
102 E.g. 4:25. If any of you have not the means wherewith to wed free believing women, 
they may wed believing girls from among those whom your right hands possess: And Allah 
hath full knowledge about your faith. Ye are one from another: Wed them with the leave of 
their owners, and give them their dowers, according to what is reasonable: They should be 
chaste, not lustful, nor taking paramours: when they are taken in wedlock, if they fall into 
shame, their punishment is half that for free women. This (permission) is for those among 
you who fear sin; but it is better for you that ye practise self-restraint. And Allah is Oft-
forgiving, Most Merciful.
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e.g. 4:25] in order to limit these abuses and alleviate/mitigate their unfa-
vourable/miserable conditions. Acknowledging the different mentality and 
conditions under which slaves were brought up and having lived, a differ-
ent set of punishments were instituted by the Qurʾān (4:25) in addition to 
a different set of social and behavioural norms.103 Indeed, the entire edifice 
of the subsequent Islamic Law and its legal theory was based on the notion 
of what Azam terms “differentiated and hierarchical ethico-moral and legal 
subjectivity” with the free Muslim man at the top and the slave woman at 
the bottom.104
It is commonly known that the practice of setting free of slaves was one 
way in which Qurʾān sanctions the expiation of one’s sins. Furthermore, 
one of the Qurʾān’s consistent features is the highlighting the importance 
of kind and gentle treatment of slaves. Moreover, Prophet’s example/ 
instructions as to the proper conduct when dealing with slaves was in com-
plete accordance with these Qurʾānic instructions.105 Thus based on above 
Qurʾān-sunna indicants the mitigating effect of Qurʾān-sunna attitude 
becomes evident again. 
Given the overall evidence and attitude of Qurʾān and sunna towards 
slavery it could be easily argued, as it was in the case of patriarchy, that the 
moral trajectory taken by the Qurʾān-sunna attitude warrants the com-
plete eradication of slavery and thus obliteration of separate moral stan-
dards/normative behaviour for free and enslaved human beings.
Again for the hermeneutical shift from the pre-classical to classical Islam 
just like in the case of issues related to male-female gender dynamics, the 
mitigating effect of the Qurʾān-sunna élan premised upon the recognition 
of the hermeneutical implications of the ethico-moral acceptance of slav-
ery in the Qurʾānic revelatory milieu was not fully recognised as a legiti-
mate hermeneutical tool that could lay path toward an ethico-religious 
values and purposive -based approaches to Qurʾān-sunna hermeneutics.106 
This, in turn, translated itself in the field of Islamic Law and legal theory. 
103 The fuqaha in the second and third centuries have made for example distinctions 
between the ‘awra (area of body to be covered during the prayer) of slave and free women. 
See Abou El-Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, pp. 255–257, ft. 106–107.
104 Azam, Sexual Violence in Maliki Legal Ideology, pp. 17–20. cf. Fatna Sabbah, Woman 
in the Muslim Unconscious, tr. M.J. Lakeland, New York, Pergamon Press, 1984.
105 As based upon corroborative written evidence found in relevant sīra, tarīh and ḥadith 
sources.
106 Indeed, all books on explication of law (usūl-ul-fiqh) deal with subjects relating 
directly to slavery.
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Indeed, as Azam argues, despite what “may have been the liberatory intent 
of the Qurʾān and the Prophetic example (sunna) the fact [remains] that 
Islamic Law legitimizes the pre-Islamic view that human being in an 
abstract sense—occupies a dual space as both a person and property, sub-
ject and object, owner and commodity”.107 
Conclusion
In summary one important component in developing ethico-religious val-
ues and purposive based Qurʾānic hermeneutic and, therefore, that of 
Islamic legal theory, is the taking into account the Qurʾānic  pre-suppositions 
evident in its text/content as well as the pre-classical nature of the Qurʾān-
sunna discourse based on their hermeneutically symbiotic, dialogical, 
ethico-religious and purposive based nature. As it was demonstrated in the 
case of some aspects of male-female gender dynamics and slavery, the 
Qurʾān-sunna mitigating effect would seem to suggest that the deeply 
embedded contextual patriarchal and slavery practices not only do not 
form the inherent components of their worldview but that the overall 
Qurʾān-sunna principles premised on the alleviation of unjust practices at 
the time of the Prophet mitigated these practices and paved the way 
towards their future complete abolition. However, often these practices 
and norms were, and in many of its aspects still are, considered by some 
Muslims as an integral and essential part of the Qurʾān-sunna normative 
worldview. In this context the purpose of this article was to emphasize that 
it is important to recognize that one of the reasons for the development 
and the continued embeddedness of this view was a result of a particular 
hermeneutical hierarchy and relationship between the Qurʾān, sunna and 
ḥadith bodies of knowledge that was formulated during the classical period 
of Islamic thought.108 Attempts to interpret the Qurʾān-sunna indicants in 
a light of a different hermeneutic or to develop an Islamic legal theory that 
is more in tune with the pre-classical Islamic thought premised on the 
hermeneutical primacy of ethico-religious values and purposive based 
approaches to Qurʾān-sunna hermeneutics are fiercely resisted by certain 
schools of thought within the Islamic tradition and are considered as 
undermining the very foundational pillars of an Islamic Weltanschauung as 
107 Azam, Sexual Violence in Maliki Legal Ideology, p. 17.
108 For other reasons in the context of status of women in Islam see Souaiaia, Contesting 
Justice, op. cit.
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they conceptualize it. In the final analyses these approaches, however, in this 
author’s mind, not only betray the pre-classical understanding of the nature 
of the Qurʾān-sunna but also restrict the inherently polysemic character of 
the Qurʾānic text, and therefore the Islamic legal theory, to its medieval 
interpretational possibilities which are based on, among others, patriarchal 
and slavery condoning values, norms and practices. 

